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Few law reform efforts in this century have been as controversial
as the often bitter fourteen-year battle within the American Law In-
stitute (ALI or Institute) over its efforts to articulate a set of rules
about American corporate law. This epic struggle ended on May 13,
1992, when the ALI formally approved the Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance I at its annual meeting in Washington.
This Article analyzes the law reform process at the ALI from a
sociological, anthropological, and public choice perspective. Thus,
rather than provide yet another critique of the various substantive
provisions of the Principles of Corporate Governance, this Article exam-
ines the process of law reform itself. I begin with the assumption
that the ALI consists of a highly prestigious group of extremely well-
informed individuals with tremendous personal integrity. Starting
with this assumption, I develop a two-part hypothesis for why the
Corporate Governance Project (Project) became so mired in contro-
versy and divisiveness. First, I hypothesize that, despite their good
intentions, the lawyers and law professors working on the Project
were "captured" by a world view that both systematically overstated
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the value of lawyers in society and systematically understated the
value of market processes in society. In other words, the people
initially involved in the Project embraced a "lawyer-centric" view of
law reform. This Project exalts the role of lawyers and litigation in
corporate governance and overstates the extent to which process-
oriented reforms are likely to succeed in improving the governance
of the American public corporation.
The first part of my hypothesis explains why the ALI adopted
what to many outside observers appeared to be a bizarre and hostile
perspective on the American business community. It explains why
proponents of the ALI's corporate governance perspective pushed
for what they characterized as the "modernization" of corporate law
despite what was accurately described as the "lack of an articulated
theoretical predicate for the structural reforms advocated." 2 Fi-
nally, the first part of the hypothesis explains why the ALI was so
surprised by the vigorous opposition to its earlier proposals.3
Second, I hypothesize that during the course of the corporate
governance law reform process, an important paradigm shift was
taking place within the ranks of the corporate bar. In particular, the
teaching and scholarship of the budding law and economics move-
ment was beginning to have an impact on practitioners. 4 This new,
interdisciplinary approach to the study of the legal system permitted
lawyers to gain a better perspective on the processes they were stud-
ying. In particular, the law and economics perspective allowed law-
yers to gain a rigorous understanding of both the theoretical
infrastructure and the underlying purposes of corporate law. This
greater perspective, in turn, gave industry critics of the Project a
group of intellectually powerful allies within the community of legal
academics that traditionally had formed the ALI's core constituency.
Put simply, over time a sort of "holy alliance" emerged between the
law and economics scholars studying the Project and such business
groups as the Business Roundtable. 5 Not surprisingly, the Business
Roundtable voiced strong objections to the ALI's proposals because
they reflected a deep hostility to the judgment and motives of cor-
porate managers. The scholarship emanating from the law and eco-
nomics movement supplied the business community with an
intellectual basis for its attacks on the ALI. Thus, whereas the first
part of my hypothesis explains why the Project reflected such a pe-
culiarly ahistorical command-and-control policy perspective, the
2. Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 554 (1984).
3. See text accompanying notes 5, 18, and 59.
4. See infra notes 69-81.
5. The Business Roundtable is a group comprised of leaders of American business
formed to promote the interests of the American business community.
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second part of my hypothesis explains why this policy perspective
ultimately was modified significantly to reflect a somewhat more
market-oriented point of view.
I. Why Did the ALl Believe Reform Was Necessary?
The ALI embarked on its Project in 1978 for reasons that were
never entirely clear. The ALI's own justifications for the Project are
circular at best and downright content-free at worst. For example,
in 1982, Roswell Perkins, the President of the ALl, claimed that the
"effort began with a growing belief on the part of Herbert Wechsler,
the ALI's director during the late 70's, that the time had come for a
major effort in the field of corporate structure and governance."'6
Of course, Perkins gave no reason why the time for a major reform
effort had come.
ALI officials also attempted to defend the huge commitment of
time and resources devoted to the Project by harkening back to the
ALI's charter, which called for the organization "to promote the
clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to
social needs... ." -7 This explanation is highly suspect in the light of
the Delaware corporate code's and the American Bar Association's
Model Business Corporation Act's service as clear, simple expressions of
corporate law. Both are widely regarded as sophisticated and ex-
tremely well-suited to societal needs.8 In particular, commentators
view the success of the Delaware corporate code as a result of that
state's ability to reduce "uncertainty concerning the consequences
of actions and hence the transaction costs of doing business." 9
Despite their vagueness and probable inaccuracy, these explana-
tions are revealing. They suggest that the ALL was motivated to em-
bark on its reform effort by internal bureaucratic incentives rather
than by external public policy concerns. In particular, the ALI prob-
ably was concerned that rival groups, such as the American Bar As-
sociation, were gaining dominance over this important field of
American law. The ALI's initial interest in the Project is best char-
acterized as little more than a bureaucratic exercise in turf-grabbing.
Indeed, the ALI itself admitted that it decided to embark upon its
reform efforts because it observed other groups successfully en-
croaching on its traditional turf, the drafting of "statements of guid-
ing principles" of corporate law.O The ALI seemed particularly
6. Roswell B. Perkins, The President's Letter, 4 A.L.I. REP. 1 (1982).
7. Id.
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (repl. vol. 1991 & Supp. 1992); MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT ANN. (rev. ed. 1991); see S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1, 17-18 (1976); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections
on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 917, 920-21
(1982); Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1455, 1455-56,
1459, 1464-69 (1985); Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law
of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 282-84 (1976); see also infra note 9 and accompanying
text.
9. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 225, 227 (1985).
10. Perkins, supra note 6, at 3.
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concerned by the efforts of the Committee on Corporate Laws of
the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, which published both a model corporate
code I and the Corporate Director's Guidebook. 12
In addition, some of the early supporters of the Project viewed the
endeavor as a useful strategy for heading off an effort by Ralph Na-
der and others to have the federal government play a larger role in
the corporate governance movement, either through federal char-
tering or through the gradual expansion of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's authority over corporate governance issues. 13
Other supporters, sympathetic to Nader, thought the Project might
be an easier way to achieve the Naderite objective of federalizing
corporate law. The latter view came to dominate the Project, which
ultimately became "a continuation of a reform movement begun, in
part, by academics who have challenged the premises underlying
traditional state corporation laws. In the early 1970s, that move-
ment focused upon the perceived need for a federal corporation
statute." 14
All that was crystal clear from the outset was that there was never
a general consensus within the ALI about what was wrong with ex-
isting corporate law or why the ALI needed to direct its massive in-
tellectual artillery toward changing it. Put another way, the Project
lacked a theoretical model. Without such a model, the ALI had no
basis for analyzing and defending its preferred menu of corporate
governance rules.
Because it lacked a conceptual framework or theoretical model,
the Project not surprisingly dealt with specific provisions and ig-
nored basic conceptual matters. 15 But this strategy did not succeed
in rescuing the ALI from controversy. The ALI's Reporters decided
to ignore interstitial details and to direct their attention to the most
important aspect of corporate law: the management of the American
11. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. (rev. ed. 1991).
12. Comm. on Corp. Laws, ABA, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595
(1978).
13. Jonathan R. Macey, Naderite Mossbacks Lose Control Over Corporate Law, WALL ST.J.,
June 24, 1992, at A21. At least one of the Reporters was squarely on the side of an
expanded federal role in corporate governance. See William L. Cary & Harvey J.
Goldschmid, Forward to the Corporate Social Responsibility Symposium: Reflections on Directors,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 1258 (1979).
14. Charles Hansen et al., The Role of Disinterested Directors in "Conflict" Transactions:
The ALI Corporate Governance Project and Existing Law, 45 Bus. LAw. 2083, 2085 n.7 (1990),
reprinted in THE AMERICAN LAW INsTrrT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT IN MID-PAS-
SAGE: WHAT WILL rr MEAN TO You? 89, 91 n.7 (National Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest
ed., 1991).
15. See Karmel, supra note 2, at 555.
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corporation. 6 The ALI's focus on governance and management is-
sues signalled corporate America that the ALI not only thought
there was something wrong with the way American firms were man-
aged, but that the remedy consisted of adding lawyers to the gov-
ernance process.
II. The Structure and Institutional Bias of the ALl
The ALI is perhaps the most elite group of lawyers in the United
States. Selected from the ranks of distinguished scholars and practi-
tioners, the Institute is best known for drafting "Restatements of the
Law" in various areas. These Restatements provide lawyers and
judges with carefully formulated descriptions of the law and tradi-
tionally have served as authoritative guides for both legal briefs and
judicial opinions.
The ALI's characterization of its corporate governance principles
as a "restatement" of existing law quickly met with skepticism. As
early as 1984, the Litigation Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion noted that:
[T]he Project was designed to effect major changes in the law of
corporate governance. As stated in [the formal report of a Com-
mittee of the Litigation Section] the Project in its then current
form would have expanded the substantive duties of directors, re-
duced the protections of the business judgment rule, and... nar-
rowed the use of intracorporate mechanisms to approve conflict
transactions. It would have then gone on to make derivative liti-
gation (used to enforce the expanded duties) easier to institute
and to maintain, and more difficult to terminate and to settle. It
would also have narrowed the opportunity for directors to obtain
the indemnification and insurance needed to cover the expanded
risks the Project had created. 17
Under heavy pressure from outside critics, the ALI ultimately disre-
garded its characterization of its Project as a "restatement" of ex-
isting law. The ALI dropped the term "Restatement" from its
reform effort and renamed the Project "Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance: Analysis and Recommendations." But controversy still raged. The
ALI's work still was expected to have a significant impact on the law.
Indeed, even before the ALI formally approved the final report in
1992, courts in nine jurisdictions had adopted the pronouncements
in the tentative drafts as law.' 8
In particular, outside critics charged that:
The Reporters identify the Project with the ALI's Restatement tra-
dition-an identification that is unwarranted but that will inevita-
bly have a detrimental effect on the case-by-case development of
corporate governance principles. The Reporters' presentation of
the Project as part of the ALI Restatement tradition creates a real
16. Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Introduction to the American Law Institute's Corporate Govern-
ance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 498 (1984).
17. Hansen et al., supra note 14, at 90 n.3. See also Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 498.
18. See, e.g., infra note 86.
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danger the Reporters' views will be accepted by the courts and
legislators as a true "Restatement" of existing law rather than the
wish-list of reformers that it actually is. 19
The name change turned out to be a mixed blessing that did little,
if anything, to allay the controversy surrounding the Project. The
ALI explained its name change in the Forward to Tentative Draft
No. 2, published in 1984.20 The ALI acknowledged that the docu-
ment did not purport to restate existing law, but then suggested that
at least some portions of the document do restate existing law, and
that the "black letter recommendations with respect to corporation
law [would not be] preceded by the words 'Corporate law should
provide' because the word 'provide' was thought by some to imply a
call for legislative as distinguished from judicial implementation,
contrary in many instances to the intention of the formulation.12 1
Thus, rather than altering the Project to restate existing law, the
ALI continued to urge radical changes to existing law. The ALI
went out of its way to emphasize that dropping the normative, value-
laden phrase "corporate law should provide" from its proposals did
not mean that the ALI was no longer urging law reform. Rather, at
the same time that the ALI stopped characterizing the Project as a
Restatement, it began advocating the view that courts should imple-
ment its recommendations unilaterally, without legislative
approval. 22
Thus, very early in the history of the Project, the Institute took the
position that its own views of corporate governance issues should
trump the rules promulgated by state legislatures. This bizarre anti-
majoritarian perspective might be understandable if the ALI were
operating in areas in which the Institute's lawyers could claim spe-
cial expertise-for example, in legal as opposed to business issues.
But the ALI made it clear that its proposals went well beyond the
confines of corporate law to include the ALI's opinions about what
constituted "good corporate practice" by corporate officers and
directors.
In other words, the ALI reformulated its corporate governance
proposals to contain some statements about the proper scope and
content of corporate law, but also included statements about how to
manage the day-to-day operations of corporations. Even the ALI ad-
mitted that the legal significance of its recommendations about
19. Hansen et al., supra note 14, at 91.
20. Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS at vii, vii-viii (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1984) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
21. Id. at viii.
22. See Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 498.
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good corporate practice was unclear.2 3 But the ALI never at-
tempted to articulate the source of its supposed expertise over
corporate strategic planning. Put differently, the Project repre-
sented a subtle attempt by a powerful and distinguished group of
lawyers to remove primary governance authority over the public
corporation from the hands of corporate management and boards
of directors and to place it in the hands of corporate lawyers and
courts.
The ALI proposed to alter the locus of decision-making authority
within the corporation by sharply curtailing the power of corporate
boards of directors to terminate lawsuits against board members,
senior management, and certain other parties. Under existing prin-
ciples of corporate law, a decision by a corporation's board of direc-
tors to terminate a lawsuit on the grounds that the suit is not in the
best interests of the corporation is entitled to great deference by
courts so long as a majority of directors is not tainted by a conflict of
interest. 24 The justification for extending broad power to corporate
boards to terminate shareholder litigation is that the members of
the board of directors of a particular corporation are best able to
determine if the pursuit of a particular cause of action is in the best
interests of that corporation.2 5 The ALI, on the other hand, took
the view that the boards of directors were hopelessly biased toward
managers and against shareholders. This view led inevitably to the
conclusion that courts and plaintiffs' attorneys should be given ex-
panded authority to evaluate claims against corporations.
The best way to view the struggle between the ALI and corporate
groups such as the Business Roundtable is as a struggle for control
over the decisionmaking process in the public corporation. Lawyers
and business executives come from radically different cultures.
Each culture has a distinct vision of how decisions ought to be
made. In particular, the business culture places a very high pre-
mium on two values that the legal culture largely ignores: speed and
cost containment in decisionmaking. 26 By contrast, the legal culture
places a very high premium on two values that the business culture
largely ignores. These values, which pervade the legal culture, are
process and advocacy.
Part II of the ALI's Report addresses the "objective" and "con-
duct" of the corporation. Although this focus may seem natural to
lawyers, to a person with a business perspective, it seems odd. From
23. Wechsler, supra note 20, at viii.
24. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr. ANN., § 7.44 (rev. ed. 1991); see United States Cop-
per Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917), cited in Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 814 (Del. 1984).
25. Courts, in the proper circumstances, will sterilize a Board's decision to termi-
nate shareholder litigation through use of the business judgement rule, which is predi-
cated upon the presumption that Boards are best able to determine the interests of the
corporation which they control.
26. For an expanded treatment of this subject, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469
(1987).
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the business perspective, a corporation's objective is clear. That ob-
jective is to make profits. So long as the corporation pursues this
objective within the bounds of the law, the conduct of the corpora-
tion should not concern lawyers. The ALI takes the view that,
though the corporation has as its objective the twin goals of enhanc-
ing corporate profit and shareholder gain, corporations may devote
resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philan-
thropic purposes, even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are
not thereby enhanced.27
This provision seems bizarre. Although corporate philanthropy
often serves corporate and shareholder interests, when corporate
philanthropy does not serve shareholder interests, it is indefensible
to allow management to use shareholders' money to pursue their
own private view of the good. If managers of public corporations,
who generally are not considered undercompensated by any mea-
sure, wish to aid some humanitarian, educational, or philanthropic
cause, they should do so with their own, and not their shareholders',
resources. From the ALI's perspective, of course, these provisions
benefit society by increasing the flow of funds to worthy causes. But
from a business perspective-particularly that of investors-the
ALI's provisions simply empower corporate management to divert
corporate resources for private interests that they are able to de-
scribe as philanthropic.
The ALI's treatment of the business judgment rule provides an-
other example of the basic difference between the way that the legal
culture views the corporate world and the way that the business cul-
ture views the corporate world. Under Section 4.01(c) of the PrinCi-
pes, a decision by a member of a board of directors is entitled to the
protections of the business judgment rule only if three conditions
are met.
First, the director must not be interested in the subject of the
business judgment.28 Second, the director must be informed with
respect to the subject of the business judgment to an appropriate
extent.29 The appropriate extent will be determined by an objective
standard, because the director or officer will only be entitled to pro-
tection "to the extent that the director or officer reasonably believes
to be appropriate under the circumstances." 30 Third, a director
must believe that the business judgment is in the best interests of
the corporation. 3'
The controversial aspect of Section 4.01 is the requirement that a
27. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 2.01(b)(3).
28. Id. § 4.01(c)(1).
29. Id. § 4.01(c)(2).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 4.01(c)(3).
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director be informed to the extent that she reasonably believes to be
appropriate under the circumstances. The business community and
the legal community have radically different views about what sort
of information-gathering is appropriate under most circumstances.
As noted above, this divergence in views results from the fact that
the business culture tends to value speed and cost containment in
decision-making more than the legal culture, whereas the legal cul-
ture values process and advocacy in decision-making more than the
business culture.3 2
In the official comment to Section 4.01, the ALI cites Casey v.
Woodruff3S for the proposition that for a business decision to be an
informed one, the directors must have exercised "reasonable dili-
gence" in coming to their conclusions. 34 This perspective finds its
most complete expression in another case that the ALI cites with
approval, Smith v. Van Gorkom3 5 (Trans Union), which has become
something of an epic wonder in the corporate world.
In that decision, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a corpo-
rate board of directors had violated its fiduciary duty of care to
shareholders and thus was subject to massive personal liability for
failing to devote sufficient attention to process and advocacy before
approving a cash-out merger offer which would have given share-
holders a substantial premium over the pre-merger market price for
their securities. 36 The Van Gorkom court based its opinion on its
conclusion that the board of directors making the underlying deci-
sion was grossly negligent for recommending the merger to the
company's shareholders without having constructed an "appropri-
ate procedural framework for the decisional process": 37
In essence, the Court decided in Trans Union that the board of
directors was grossly negligent for making a business decision
without the benefits of a deliberative process resembling an adju-
dication. In other words, the court in Trans Union decided that the
hasty decision-making process made by the board was per se ac-
tionable. The court never even considered the possibility that the
board might have decided that the costs of engaging in such delib-
eration might outweigh the benefits. In particular, the delibera-
tive process would be costly if it resulted in a delay that caused the
bidder to withdraw its bid, thereby depriving the shareholders of
the opportunity to obtain the substantial premium for their shares
being offered.
In a nutshell, the Delaware Supreme Court in Tram Union faults
the directors of Trans Union for not engaging a sufficient number
32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
33. 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
34. Id. at 643; see Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) cmt. e, at 233-36.
35. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
36. Id. at 864.
37. Jonathan R. Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the American Law
School, 45 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 26, on file with author).
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of lawyers and investment bankers to provide a suitable paper rec-
ord to justify the transaction.3 8
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Trans Union re-
flects what might best be described as a lawyer-centric view of the
world. The values of deliberation and process are exalted, to the
detriment of the values of efficiency and cost-containment that are
dear to the world of business.3 9 The business decision facing the
Trans Union board was a simple one: whether the price being of-
fered should be accepted.
From a business perspective, the directors probably thought they
had all the information they needed. The firm's shares were traded
on the New York Stock Exchange. The directors knew that the price
being offered was fifty percent above the existing market price for
the firm's securities, and that this price represented the best valua-
tion of the most sophisticated capital market in the world.40 The
directors also knew that they had been trying to sell the firm for
some time with no success, and that the offeror insisted that his offer
remain open for only a short time and be contingent on the firm
refraining from actively soliciting other offers.41
Thus, from the perspective of efficiency and cost-containment, the
directors took the view that they had all the information they
needed. In particular, the directors realized that delay would in-
volve significant costs, and that if they held out for more money they
were "risking winding up with nothing." 42 The opinion in Trans
Union, like the Project as a whole, represents a victory for the legal
community over the business community. Like the ALI's analysis
and recommendations, at the margin, the decision will result in a
transfer of wealth from the business community to the legal and in-
vestment banking communities. As Geoffrey Miller and I have
observed:
[T]he remedy prescribed by Trans Union is far more than a nos-
trum. To be sure, the case will increase the use of investment
bankers and lawyers in corporate decision-making. We agree with
the proposition that in general the increased "papering" of board
decisions will not substantially raise the level of deliberations. In
this respect, the case appears as a boon to investment bankers and
lawyers, but as a net cost for shareholders of Delaware corpora-
tions and for the nation's economy generally.43
38. Id.; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98
YALE L.J. 127 (1988).
39. See supra note 26.
40. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869 n. 9.
41. Id. at 868; see Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the TransUnion
Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 1437, 1448 (1985).
42. Fischel, supra note 41, at 1449.
43. Macey & Miller, supra note 38, at 139. By forcing corporate boards to keep a
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Trans Union thus shows the extent to which the values of the legal
profession, which stresses the virtues of advocacy and process and
ignores other values such as efficiency and cost containment, are in-
ternalized by lawyers, including lawyers who serve as judges.
The final battle in the fourteen-year war to win approval of the
Principles concerned the so-called demand requirement, the process
by which a shareholder is required to petition a board of directors to
address alleged wrongdoing by a director or officer as a pre-condi-
tion to filing a derivative lawsuit on behalf of the corporation against
that officer or director.44 The business perspective would favor giv-
ing the board of directors broad, perhaps unfettered discretionary
authority to reject a shareholder's demand. A business perspective
also would require that courts accord the board substantial defer-
ence when reviewing a board's recommendation to decline to take
action against an officer or director. By contrast, the ALI would ex-
pand the authority of state judges to review a board's decision to
reject a shareholder's demands to take action against officers and
directors. 45
The battle lines between the legal community and the business
community over the demand requirement were clearly drawn before
the start of the ALI's annual meeting on May 12, 1992. The ALI's
Reporters wanted to change the pre-existing rules regarding de-
mand in several ways. 46 First, the Reporters wanted to create a new
two-tiered standard of review, whereby courts would give a lower
level of deference to corporate boards in duty-of-loyalty cases than
in duty-of-care cases. 47 The Reporters also wanted to give courts
expanded power to engage in de novo review of all motions to dis-
miss lawsuits against insiders and drew additional distinctions be-
tween lawsuits brought against insiders and lawsuits brought against
third parties unaffiliated with the corporation.48
The most striking difference between the Reporters' approach
and the business approach was that the Reporters would have re-
quired corporate boards of directors to provide courts .with state-
ments defending their actions in all cases, even those in which a
majority of the directors of the corporation were independent and
not implicated in the shareholders' obligations.49 In other words,
under the ALI's approach, a shareholder would be able to obtain
paper trail, the court is in essence compelling corporate boards to spend additional
funds on bankers' opinion letters and valuation studies and lawyers' safety letters and
counselling. Id.
44. This debate concerned Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 7.03(a).
45. See id. §§ 7.08-.10.
46. The highlights of the ALI proposals and the differences between the ALI ap-
proach and the somewhat more business-oriented approach of the Delaware judiciary
are elegantly summarized in Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board
in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALl Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAw.
503 (1989).
47. Id. at 517-19.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 515.
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judicial review of his derivative suit regardless of the action taken by
a board of directors.
Critics of the Reporters' proposal noted that courts reviewing
board decisions to reject plaintiffs' demands could not merely ad-
dress their attention to the adequacy of the plaintiffs' complaint, but
would be required to engage in some level of substantive review of
board decisions regardless of how independent the directors were
or what sort of violations were being alleged.50 Moreover, critics
noted that the Reporters failed to consider the costs of their
proposal:
[T]he Reporters apparently regard as relevant costs only the con-
tingent fee of the derivative plaintiff's attorney. Costs incurred by
the corporation related to the action are apparently disregarded
in the stockholders' calculation of the expected net (private or
public) benefits of the action. The derivative suit is thus a "free
lunch," so far as the stockholders of the affected firm are
concerned. 51
From a business perspective, there are significant costs to deriva-
tive litigation beyond the contingency fee. Among these costs are
the costs of defending the lawsuit, including not just the lawyers'
fees, but also the cost of the time lost by management in deposi-
tions, in complying with discovery requests, in testifying, and in con-
sulting with their attorneys. Moreover, defending these lawsuits
involves more inchoate costs, such as the loss of reputational capital
by the firm, and the loss of morale among the workers. 52
From the lawyers' perspective, the proposed recommendations
improved the quality of corporate governance in two ways. The
proposal improved the board's decisionmaking process by permit-
ting judicial review of the board's decisional procedures. The Re-
porters also reasoned that their proposal improved the decisional
process involving whether to reject a shareholder's demand by mak-
ing it more adversarial in nature.53 Indeed, the Reporters were
quite frank about their purpose, noting that encouraging more de-
rivative lawsuits provided "the necessary opportunity for judicial
law-making, both in updating the common law and in filling the in-
evitable gaps left by legislation. In this respect, the action has an
educational and socializing function. '54
During the debates over these controversial provisions, the ALI
Reporters retreated slightly and accepted an amendment that made
50. Id at 517-19.
51. Id. at 529.
52. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982).
53. See AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS Part VII introductory note, reporter's note at 11-13 (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 8].
54. Id. at 11.
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it somewhat easier for corporate boards to obtain dismissal of deriv-
ative complaints. Under the adopted version of Section 7.04(a),
corporations are entitled to make a representation to a plaintiff that
her demand for remedial action is being rejected by a board (or
board committee) comprised of disinterested directors who com-
prise a majority of the board, and who, as a group, are capable of
making an objective judgment in the circumstances. 55 If the board
makes such a representation, the plaintiff's complaint must be dis-
missed unless the plaintiff can plead with particularity that the
board's representations were incorrect, or that the board's decision-
making process in rejecting the demand violated the business judg-
ment rule, or other appropriate standards. 56 A corporation would
be entitled to obtain dismissal of a plaintiff's suit prior to discovery
if the complaint did not plead these facts with sufficient particularity.
In sum, although the compromises adopted at the ALI's May 1992
meeting did not give the business community everything it wanted,
critics agree that the outcome "gives explicit attention and effect to
the decision of disinterested directors to reject demand. '57 In the
end, even Charles Hansen, a prominent corporate lawyer and per-
haps the most outspoken and articulate critic of the ALI's anti-busi-
ness bias, voted for the compromise "in the interests of comity"
because it returned to the board "a very meaningful role for a disin-
terested board in handling derivative litigation."58 On the other
hand, not everybody on the lawyer-centric side of the debate was so
complacent. In an outraged editorial, Monroe Freedman com-
plained that:
Corporate lawyers take care of their own-their own firms, that is,
followed by their own clients....
The corporate bar (ALI) adopted "principles" that permit cor-
porate defendants who have been charged with wrongdoing to
take control of, and then dismiss, the suits against them. More-
over, reversing the original drafts by the law professors who
served as reporters for the project, the adopted principles would
allow corporate defendants to do this without court approval. 59
But the compromise in the final hours was only one of many that
the ALI Reporters accepted during the fourteen-year life of the con-
troversial Project. As the next two Sections explain, the controversy
surrounding the ALI's report can be traced to two sources. First,
the intellectual revolution caused by the law and economics move-
ment caught up with the Project. This scholarly movement gave
considerable intellectual firepower to the groups whose interests
were adversely affected by the Reporters' work.
55. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 7.04(a).
56. Id.
57. This reaction of the ALI's critics was summarized in ALI Wraps Up Corporation
Law Project, Works on Lawyer Ethics, Complex Trials, 60 U.S.L.W. 2727, 2728 (May 26,
1992).
58. Id.
59. Monroe Freedman, Corporate Bar Protects Its Own, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON,
June 15, 1992, at 20.
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Second, the ALI became a victim of its own success. Although
corporate America frequently lobbies Congress and state legisla-
tures to obtain legislation that is consistent with their interests, busi-
ness interest groups considered it inappropriate to lobby the
prestigious American Law Institute. But the influence of the ALI
has grown considerably since its inception in 1923. It is no longer a
cozy intellectual enclave where academic and practicing lawyers can
come together to discuss law reform at a lofty intellectual level.
Although the ALI's publications technically are not binding on state
or federal judges, courts typically rely on them, particularly where
judges face novel or difficult issues of first impression in their juris-
diction.60 As the ALI's prestige has grown, its practical influence on
real world outcomes has grown as well. And, as its practical influ-
ence has grown, interest groups increasingly have found it in their
interest to devote resources to influencing the outcomes of the
ALI's decisional process. The final section of this paper will discuss
the ethical implications of that phenomenon.
III. The Shifting Paradigm
When the Project was begun in 1978, corporate law was in the
midst of an intellectual revolution that would lead to a major change
in the way scholars view the role of corporate law. In particular, the
law and economics movement was replacing the traditional view that
shareholders were helpless pawns ruthlessly exploited by manage-
ment with the view that a variety of market forces operates, albeit
imperfectly, to cause corporate management to maximize profits.
Traditional thinking was that continued shareholder litigation
should be encouraged as a means for controlling deviance by corpo-
rate managers and directors.61 The new market-oriented perspec-
tive held that the best way to protect shareholders was by enforcing
the contracts among shareholders, officers, and directors, and by
fashioning legal rules that encourage the operation of market forces
to constrain opportunistic management.
This new perspective was "astonishingly unrepresented" in the
early days of the Project, as Ralph Winter, a prominent federal
judge closely associated with the law and economics movement,
noted at the time.62 Judge Winter observed that, of the four Re-
porters, ten Consultants, and forty-five Advisers to the ALI's Corpo-
rate Governance Project, in the early days, only one Adviser was
affiliated with the modern law and economics approach to corporate
60. See infra note 86.
61. See infra notes 70-77.
62. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Development of the Law of Corporate Governance, 9 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 524, 528-29 (1985).
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law. 63
As a result of the underrepresentation, and much to the shock of
the distinguished older scholars at the helm of the Project, promi-
nent scholars familiar with the new paradigm began to criticize the
ALI's efforts. For example, in 1983, Henry Manne, a prominent
member of the law and economics movement, labeled the ALI's
early recommendations "a new threat to the corporate free enter-
prise system," because the proposals would have removed corpo-
rate authority from the hands of boards of directors within the
corporation and markets and into the hands of courts and lawyers.6
The generation of scholars who served as Reporters for the Pro-
ject came of age when intellectual discourse about corporate law
and public policy toward corporate governance was dominated by
the world view of Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means. 65 This intel-
lectual approach, which dominated public discourse for fifty years,
portrayed managers as out of control. Berle and Means attributed
this to the "separation of ownership and control"-another term
for a division of labor in which some people specialize in risk-
bearing through investment, while others specialize in manage-
ment. When thousands of people hold investment interests in a
firm, none has much incentive to oversee the managers. Each in-
vestor, rightly thinking that his efforts can do little, will be passive.
The investors are scattered, uncoordinated, and helpless. They
have ownership without control; the managers have control with-
out ownership.
Berle and Means also thought that corporations were growing
in size and influence.... The managers, responsible to no one,
could exploit investors and consumers alike.66
This view of corporate America, in which investors were subject
to wholesale exploitation by the managers of the firms in which they
chose to invest, provided the intellectual "underpinning of the
ALI's proposals on corporate governance."6 7 Consistent with Berle
and Means' perspective, the ALI's initial proposals and commentary
appeared to "rest on the Berle and Means diagnosis of helplessness.
[The Reporters] believe that managers have seized control, [and]
that investors are powerless."68
Soon a group of scholars applying economic analysis to legal rules
began to present new theories and data to refute the Berle and
Means paradigm. In an important article in 1984, then-Professor
Frank Easterbrook, a prominent member of this group, described
some of the work of the Chief Reporter of the Project as "filled with
63. Id. at 529 n.1.
64. See Macey, supra note 13, at A21.
65. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
66. Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evi-
dence, 9 DEL.J. CORP. L. 540, 540 (1984).
67. Id. at 541.
68. Id.
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unsupported assertions that managers and state law exploit inves-
tors"; it "does not cite, let alone discuss, any contrary data and
theory." 69
Where the followers of Berle and Means thought they saw perva-
sive and systematic market failure; the scholars working in law and
economics found considerable evidence that market forces provided
shareholders with a large measure of protection by effectively con-
trolling managerial shirking.70 In particular, competition in the cap-
ital markets, the product markets, the managerial labor markets, and
the market for corporate control combined to ensure not only that
managers would work to maximize profits, but also that corpora-
tions would seek to register their corporate charters in corporate
domiciles that lowered costs and provided shareholders with incen-
tives to invest.71
Proponents of an economic approach to law observed that if firms
did not locate in jurisdictions with corporate law rules that maxi-
mized shareholder wealth, they would
be at a disadvantage in raising debt or equity capital relative to
corporations chartered in other states. Management must induce
investors freely to choose their firm's stock instead of, among
other things, stock in companies incorporated in other states or
other countries, bonds, bank accounts, certificates of deposit,
partnerships ... present consumption, etc .... [A] corporation's
ability to compete effectively in product markets is related to its
ability to raise capital, and management's tenure in office is re-
lated to the price of stock. If management is to secure initial capi-
tal and have continuous access to ready capital in the future, it
must attract investors away from the almost infinite variety of
competing opportunities. Moreover, to retain its position, man-
agement has a powerful incentive to keep the price of stock high
enough to prevent takeovers, a result obtained by making the cor-
poration an attractive investment.72
Considerable support for the law and economics perspective-
that the benefits of heightened regulation of the corporate govern-
ance process outweigh the costs-came from growing acceptance of
the so-called economic theory of regulation or "public choice." 73
The economic theory of regulation provided a theoretical predicate
for many peoples' intuitions about the political process. This theory
modeled the political process from an economic perspective. It
69. Id at 541 n.3 (discussing Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law:
An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187 (1983)).
70. Ia at 553-57.
71. See Fischel, supra note 8, at 917, 920-21.
72. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 257 (1977).
73. For a general description of this theory, see Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice:
The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1988).
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demonstrated that political outcomes generally reflect the prefer-
ences of narrowly focused, self-aggrandizing, special interest
groups. In particular, under the public choice model, regulation
does not serve the interests of the public, but rather the interests of
the entities being regulated.74 As Professor Easterbrook observed,
the pro-regulatory philosophy of the ALI Reporters was subject to
considerable doubt due to the fact that "[r]egulation is increasingly
seen as the consequence of interest-group politics, in which the reg-
ulated firms themselves obtain regulation in order to forestall
competition." 75
Finally, the arguments made by those in the law and economics
movement against the pro-regulatory approach of the ALI were bol-
stered by the more rigorous analytical methods of the lawyer-econo-
mists studying corporate law. In particular, the economics
movement developed models that were sufficiently precise to lend
themselves to empirical analysis. 76 This ability to analyze and test
their hypotheses formally saved the law and economics scholars
from the charge that their conclusions were blinded by ideological
faith in market forces. To this charge, the law and economics schol-
ars were able to present scientific evidence that allowed them to
claim that the existing, market-oriented legal norms were superior
to the ALI's proposed norms from the perspective of the investing
public. 77
Soon, numbers of distinguished corporate lawyers joined the mar-
ket-oriented academics in opposing the ALI's early efforts. 78 This
opposition was largely due to the fact that the ALl decided to de-
scribe its early efforts as one of its "Restatements" of existing law. 79
This characterization prompted incredulity. Charles Hansen, a
prominent corporate lawyer and member of the ALl, wrote in 1990
that the ALI's positions "do not reflect current law but rather call
for fundamental and unwarranted changes in existing law."' 0 Like
the market-oriented scholars, the corporate lawyers were concerned
that the Project was an attempt radically to transform America's cor-
porate law into a regime in which plaintiffs' attorneys could chal-
lenge corporate actions in court over a wide range of issues
regardless of whether a majority of independent directors on the
corporation's board viewed the shareholder's action as beneficial to
the corporation.
The criticisms of the early versions of the Project from market-
74. Id. at 46-51.
75. Easterbrook, supra note 66, at 541.
76. See generally id. at 557-64 (assessing manager self-interest by examining stock
ownership, sources of compenstion, relation between performance and compensation,
and relation between performance and structure of ownership).
77. Id. at 571.
78. See Dennis S. Block et al., The Role of the BusinessJudgment Rule in Shareholder Litiga-
tion at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. LAw. 469, 501-09 (1990); Dooley & Veasey, supra
note 46, at 503; Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due
Care and the Business Judgment Rule: A Commentary, 41 Bus. LAw. 1237 (1986).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
80. Hansen et al., supra note 14, at 90.
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oriented legal scholars and corporate practitioners were joined by
attacks from corporate America. The American Corporate Counsel
Association, the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, the
Business Roundtable, and the National Association of Manufactur-
ers all acted in various ways to influence the ALI's deliberations.
There were rumors and allegations that corporations were trying
to protect their interests both by hiring members of the ALI to repre-
sent their interests in that body's deliberations and by firing law
firms that strongly supported the ALI's efforts to transform Ameri-
can corporate law. The ALI reacted to these lobbying efforts with
outrage and dismay. Roswell Perkins, then-president of the ALl and
partner in the prestigious New York law firm Debevoise & Plimpton,
expressed his concern that the ALl not become a" 'forum for power
plays by clients' " and told ALI members that" 'the precept of leav-
ing one's client at the door must be honored if we are to preserve
our integrity as an organization.' "81
IV The Ethics of the Politics
The allegations of political maneuvering by interested groups
such as the Business Roundtable were grounded in fact.8 2 The issue
is whether there is anything wrong with these activities. Should
such lobbying and influence peddling be considered unethical? Is it
a threat to the "integrity" of the ALl? I wish to address these ques-
tions in this section because, as suggested in the preceding section,
to this point it has been taken for granted that such lobbying is im-
proper.83 But, a closer analysis of both the important societal role
played by the ALI and the structural bias of its own membership,
which is comprised exclusively of lawyers, leads inexorably to the
conclusion that the lobbying and political maneuvering of interested
groups was only right and proper.
First, the vigorous lobbying by corporate interests was just that-
lobbying. The efforts of interest groups "ranged from corporate-
sponsored luncheons and telephone letter-writing campaigns to a
get-out-the-vote drive that helped produce an unusually large turn-
out of more than 500 members at the (annual meeting at which the
corporate governance proposals were put forward for membership
vote)." '8 4 Ronald Gilson, a Reporter and professor at Stanford Law
81. Freedman, supra note 59, at 20 (quoting President Perkins at the ALI's 1991
annual meeting).
82. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
84. Kenneth Jost, Corporate Counsel Win Shareholder Suit War; Intense Lobbying Preceded
American Law Institute's Vote on 1,000 Page Report on Corporate Governance, AM. LAW., May
20, 1992, at 3.
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School, observed, "I've never felt like a Congressman before. 85
The corporate world was treating the ALI's Reporters like mem-
bers of Congress because they were acting like members of Con-
gress. The ALl had consciously and deliberately departed from its
accustomed role of creating and publishing "Restatements" and
had promulgated a set of rules of corporate governance that were
likely to have a considerable effect on the corporate world. The cor-
porate world was well aware that the ALI's rules were likely to have
a strong impact on corporate governance norms for two reasons.
First, the extraordinary prestige enjoyed by the ALI would, by itself,
produce this outcome. Second, well before the Report had been
finalized, a number of courts had begun to cite even the most pre-
liminary work of the Reporters as authoritative.8 6 Indeed, at least
one court cited as authoritative portions of the Principles that were
later abandoned by the ALI itself,8 7
Because the ALI's rules were likely to have a substantial impact on
their welfare, corporate interests predictably decided to expend re-
sources to influence the outcomes within the ALI. Moreover, to the
extent that corporate officers and directors believed that the ALl
recommendations would harm their firms' shareholders by raising
their firms' costs of doing business, such officers and directors
would have a duty to express their views to the ALI's leadership in
order to protect their shareholders' interests.
The right to petition Congress for redress is an integral part of
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Indeed, the right to petition policy-
makers for redress of grievances was established by King John's
signing of the Magna Carta in 1215. In addition to the freedoms of
speech, association and assembly, the right to petition Congress is
an integral aspect of freedom of expression.88 Significantly, the
Supreme Court has held that the right to petition Congress is not
limited to political causes but extends to economic causes and busi-
ness interests.8 9 Firms even enjoy an exception from the general
provisions of the antitrust laws for their lobbying efforts. 90 The ef-
forts of the business community to influence the outcomes within
85. Id. One of the Reporters, Professor John Coffee of Columbia, also observed:
"[T]here was a hell of a lot of lobbying." Il-
86. See, e.g., Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 235 (Ill. 1988) (citing Tentative
Draft No. 8, § 7.02 as authoritative); Dynan v. Fritz, 508 N.E.2d 1371, 1378 (Mass. 1987)
(citing AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1986); Gries Sports Enters. v. Cleve-
land Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 971-72 (Ohio 1986) (Brown, J. concurring)
(stating that "our decision harmonizes with the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendation, Tentative Draft No. 5.").
87. Miller v. Register. & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983)
(adopting derivative litigation rules contained in AMERICAN LAW INST. PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.03
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982) that subsequently were rejected by the Reporters).
88. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONsTrrTUTIONAL LAW § 16.53, at 1128-29 (4th ed. 1991).
89. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
90. Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
135 (1961).
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the ALI's governing process were wholly consonant with this rich
tradition.
Some might argue that the introduction of business interests into
the ALI's deliberative process would skew the Institute's efforts
away from consumer interests, whose views also were wholly unrep-
resented. But this argument ignores the fact that, without the in-
volvement of the business community, the only interests being
represented within the ALI were the interests of the legal community.
As noted above, considering only the interests of the legal commu-
nity would not produce an impartial, public-regarding outcome.
Rather, such an exclusive focus would result only in a set of policy
prescriptions that exalted the process and advocacy values of the
legal system at the expense of the values of efficiency and cost con-
tainment. 91 Thus, excluding the lobbying efforts of business was
more likely to produce an outcome that expanded the demand for
lawyers than to produce an outcome that provided discernible bene-
fits for investors or consumers.
Similarly, the argument that lobbying by business was unethical
also ignores the fact that discrete, well organized groups are always
better represented in legislative processes than disparate, unorgan-
ized groups such as consumers. 92 Moreover, business interests were
more likely to reflect consumers' preferences, at least to some ex-
tent, than the lawyers were. This is because lawyers are sociologi-
cally biased towards establishing rules that increase transaction
costs, while business interests are sociologically biased towards
rules that decrease such costs.
The President of the ALI found it " 'particularly distasteful' " that
business interests were imposing economic pressure to cause ALI
members to change their views. 93 In theory, of course, President
Perkins' justification for excluding business interests was that ALI
members should be impartial policy-makers. In practice, the result
was that the only institutional perspective reflected in early drafts of
the Project was that of the legal profession. That group can hardly
be considered disinterested or unbiased.
Conclusion
The ALI's effort to reform American corporate law began with a
series of early ALI drafts that embraced the view that the authority
to govern the affairs of America's public corporations should be re-
moved from corporate boardrooms to the state courtrooms. Gradu-
ally, as a result of relentless lobbying, the process within the ALI
1993]
91. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
92. See Macey, supra note 73, at 46-51.
93. Freedman, supra note 59, at 20 (quoting President Perkins).
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opened up. Attendance at ALI meetings discussing corporate gov-
ernance issues tripled as a result of the controversy surrounding the
Project.94 Over time, representatives from the law and economics
movement obtained greater representation among the Reporters,
Consultants, and Advisers to the Project. The hundreds of scholarly
articles and conferences devoted to the ALI's proposals had an in-
fluence despite the fact that many of these projects enjoyed corpo-
rate sponsorship. Gradually, even some of the traditional scholars
associated with the Project began to see the merit in their oppo-
nents' perspectives. By the time the ALI membership approved the
1,068-page Final Draft at its annual meeting in May 1992, even the
complaints of such old opponents as Henry Manne and Charles
Hansen had diminished to a considerable extent.
Although the ALI set out fourteen years ago to transform Ameri-
can corporate law, American corporate law will hardly be affected by
the modest reforms that finally were approved. Ironically, the most
radical transformation has been within the ALI itself. The ALI is no
longer the quiet, elite, academic enclave it was fourteen years ago.
It is now a very public, democratic, quasi-legislative body subject to
all the usual controversy and intrigue.
Thus, the real story of the ALI's Corporate Governance Project is
the story of the transformation of an institution. When the Project
began, the ALI considered itself a genteel, republican,95 deliberative
body, confident that its own intellectual might and civic virtue would
produce public benefits. In the end, the pluralists had conquered
the republicans, as interest group politics came to dominate the lat-
ter years of the ALI's deliberations.
The final outcome reflects the inelegant interest-group consensus
that is the natural byproduct of pluralist debate. The result is, at
least to some extent, a strong endorsement of the power of ideas-
particularly economic ideas-in a political arena. Though the final
result may be the inelegant manifestations of a series of difficult
compromises, it is a vast improvement over the earlier drafts.
94. See Macey, supra note 13, at A21.
95. The term "republican" as used here does not refer to political party affiliation.
Rather, the term is used as it is in political theory-to refer to the republican belief in
the ability of decision-makers to subordinate their own private interests to the public
good. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1540 (1988).
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